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Container Apps Redeploy + App Insights Error Cleanup

Date: 2026-05-25

Motivation

Operator request: redeploy every sidecar of the bundled Container App ca-elb-dashboard-01 and clear all errors surfacing in App Insights / LAW. Constraint: hygiene/bug-fix only — no feature work.

Two distinct error sources were active in ContainerAppConsoleLogs_CL for the last hour before this change:

  1. AuthorizationFailure + Traceback from the worker sidecar (reconcile_auto_warmup raising UnpickleableExceptionWrapper) because the workload Storage account stelbdashboard01mul5oh5j had drifted into a half-baked publicNetworkAccess=Disabled state with zero private endpoints — neither the lockdown nor the bootstrap posture from infra/main.bicep. Direct ARM update restored Enabled + defaultAction=Allow + bypass=AzureServices, immediately eliminating the auth failures.
  2. Connection refused / Error 111 spam from cgroup_reporter in api, worker, frontend, terminal during the first 30-60 s of every revision activation — the in-revision redis sidecar takes longer than the other sidecars to bind 127.0.0.1:6379, so the 5-second metrics tick logs a warning on every miss. Also a one-shot worker/beat FATAL: Redis not reachable after 120s when the redis sidecar's cold start exceeds the wait_redis.py timeout.

User-facing change

None. Pure operational hygiene.

API / Code diff summary

# File Change
1 api/services/cgroup_reporter.py Add CGROUP_REDIS_GRACE_TICKS (default 12 = 60 s). First N RedisError ticks log at DEBUG; after that, escalate to WARNING. Counter resets on the first successful publish, with an INFO recovery line if at least one tick had failed.
2 terminal/cgroup_reporter.py Same grace-tick logic, standalone copy used by the terminal sidecar.
3 web/cgroup_reporter.py Same grace-tick logic, standalone copy used by the frontend sidecar.
4 api/wait_redis.py Default REDIS_WAIT_TIMEOUT bumped 120 s → 180 s. Container Apps occasionally needs more than 2 min for the in-revision redis sidecar to bind during activation.
5 api/services/auto_warmup_reconcile.py Wrap the list_auto_warmup_preferences() call inside reconcile_auto_warmup_preferences in try/except. On transient Storage failures the task now logs a WARNING and returns {"status": "list_failed", …} instead of raising and producing an UnpickleableExceptionWrapper. Mirrors the defensive pattern already used by reconcile_stale_jobs and backfill_completed_runtime_metrics.

No IaC diff. (See "Follow-up" below for the deferred Bicep split.)

Out-of-band runtime change

stelbdashboard01mul5oh5j was drifted (PNA Disabled, no PE) and corrected via direct az storage account update:

az storage account update \
  --subscription 00000000-0000-0000-0000-0000000000a1 \
  -g rg-elb-dashboard-01 \
  -n stelbdashboard01mul5oh5j \
  --public-network-access Enabled \
  --default-action Allow \
  --bypass AzureServices

Resulting posture: publicNetworkAccess=Enabled, defaultAction=Allow, bypass=AzureServices, 0 ipRules, 0 vnetRules. This matches what infra/main.bicep produces when lockdownPrivateNetworking=false (the current default) — i.e. it restores the deploy-time posture. Charter §9 calls for production to be Disabled. See "Follow-up".

Deploy summary

Sidecar Tag Revision introducing it Final active revision
api / worker / beat 20260525211518 0000015 0000017 (Healthy, traffic 100, 1 replica)
terminal 20260525212015 0000016 0000017
frontend 20260525212254 0000017 0000017

Each az containerapp update --container-name <name> rolls the template forward into a new revision that inherits the previously deployed images of the other containers. After all three deploys the final revision 0000017 carries the patched images for every sidecar, traffic 100, 1 replica, Healthy. Older revisions auto-deactivated.

Frontend redeploy used the documented env-export pattern: back up web/.env.local, empty it, run quick-deploy.sh frontend with explicit VITE_AUTH_DEV_BYPASS=false + AUTH_DEV_BYPASS=false exports, restore the backup.

Frontend SPA env validation

Verified against the served /runtime-config.js:

window.__ELB_RUNTIME_CONFIG__ = {
  "VITE_API_BASE_URL": "",
  "VITE_AUTH_DEV_BYPASS": "false",
  "VITE_AZURE_REDIRECT_URI": "__RUNTIME__",
  "VITE_AZURE_TENANT_ID":   "00000000-…",
  "VITE_AZURE_CLIENT_ID":   "ddf48c19-…",
  …feature flags…
};

Main bundle (/assets/index-DzOEESD2.js) grep -c 'localhost:8085' = 0.

Validation evidence

Pre-change LAW (last 5 m, 21:10 KST)

ContainerName    Cat                   N
api              RedisRefused          116
terminal         RedisRefused          59
frontend         RedisRefused          59
worker           AuthorizationFailure  6
worker           Traceback             4
worker           ERROR                 3
worker           FATAL                 2
beat             FATAL                 2

Post-storage-fix LAW (last 3 m, 21:11 KST)

  • AuthorizationFailure: 6 → 0
  • Traceback: 4 → 0
  • worker ERROR: false positives (Celery success lines containing the string errors: 0); no genuine errors remained.

Post-patch LAW (rev 0000017, 21:25 → 21:29 KST window, ~4 min after final activation)

Same KQL pattern as pre-change, filtered to the new revision only:

ContainerName_s    Cat                   N
-----------------  --------------------  -
(no rows)

Zero rows in any of: AuthorizationFailure, RedisRefused (Connection refused), FATAL, Traceback. The 4–5 minute post-activation window historically produced ~250 RedisRefused spam lines from the api container alone (revision 0000012 sample: api 252, frontend 126, terminal 124, worker/beat FATAL 4/4 each).

Cross-cutting verification: RedisRefused on the patched sidecars after the in-revision redis sidecar bound (Redis ready at 127.0.0.1:6379 (attempt 4)) — within the 180 s wait_redis.py budget and the 60 s cgroup_reporter grace window. The only remaining warning-class line on 0000017 is the pre-existing Celery SecurityWarning: You're running the worker with superuser privileges — out of scope; unchanged from baseline.

Per-revision RedisRefused trend (last 30 min):

Revision api frontend terminal worker beat
0000010 — — — 36 AuthFail + 24 Traceback —
0000011 54 27 27 1 FATAL 1 FATAL
0000012 252 126 124 4 FATAL 4 FATAL
0000013 — — — 2 —
0000014 — 1 — — —
0000015 — 8 6 — —
0000016 — 1 — — —
0000017 0 0 0 0 0

Tests + lint

uv run pytest -q api/tests/test_cgroup_reporter.py api/tests/test_auto_warmup.py
# 18 passed in 3.79s

uv run ruff check api/services/cgroup_reporter.py \
  api/services/auto_warmup_reconcile.py api/wait_redis.py \
  terminal/cgroup_reporter.py web/cgroup_reporter.py
# All checks passed!

Follow-up (open issue when next operator window allows)

infra/main.bicep currently exposes a single lockdownPrivateNetworking toggle that couples Storage and ACR network state. Charter §9 requires production Storage at publicNetworkAccess=Disabled, but flipping the same toggle to true also locks ACR — and would break az acr build from the maintainer laptop. The right shape is to split the toggle into lockdownStorageNetworking and lockdownAcrNetworking so the Storage half can be set to true without disabling local ACR builds. Tracking issue to be filed; until then the deployed environment runs in bootstrap posture and the scripts/dev/storage-public-access.sh on/off helper covers any emergency widening.

Addendum (same day, later session): Celery worker Azure SDK

HTTP-logging noise + second environment discovery

Motivation

Follow-up operator request: "App Insights에서 오류 확인해서 모두 조치해줘" (check all App Insights errors and fix them). The audit discovered two material facts:

  1. There is no App Insights resource in this subscription — all telemetry flows to LAW (ContainerAppConsoleLogs_CL). So "App Insights" in the request really means "Container App console logs in LAW".
  2. There are actually two parallel Container App deployments in the same subscription, and the morning's cleanup had only touched one:
  3. Env A (azd env elb-dashboard, default): ca-elb-dashboard-01 in rg-elb-dashboard-01, LAW workspace 78faaeb6-…. Patched this morning to revision 0000017.
  4. Env B (azd env elb-ca): ca-elb-dashboard in rg-elb-dashboard, LAW workspace 1a557a86-…. Not patched this morning. Still on image tag 20260525160858 (pre-cgroup, pre-wait-redis, pre-auto-warmup fixes), revision 0000013.

The strict ERROR-class KQL audit on both LAW workspaces returned zero hits on the latest active revisions (0000017 for env A, 0000013 for env B). However a broader "what is the worker actually logging?" query exposed a structural log-volume issue:

  • Env B worker (rev 0000013): ~5 741 lines / hour dominated by Azure SDK http_logging_policy INFO dumps — full request + response headers ('x-ms-version': 'REDACTED', Request method: 'GET', 'User-Agent': 'azsdk-python-data-tables/12.5.0…', 'Server': 'Windows-Azure-Table/1.0…', etc.) on every Storage Table call. Extrapolated 24h ≈ ~138k lines from a single replica.
  • Env B worker (rev 0000008, the previously-active rev for ~20 h before this morning's terminal redeploy): 756 206 lines / 24 h. Same root cause.
  • Env A worker (rev 0000017): same log-volume pattern at similar rate (~10 dumps per Table call sample).

Root cause

api/main.py (the FastAPI entrypoint, used only by the api sidecar) carries an Azure SDK silencer block that drops azure.core.pipeline.policies.http_logging_policy, azure.identity, urllib3.connectionpool, and httpx to WARNING (overridable via AZURE_LOG_LEVEL). The worker and beat sidecars do not import api.main — their entrypoint is api.celery_app, which inherits the root logging config from logging.basicConfig in api.app.logging_config but had no Azure SDK silencer of its own. So every Storage-Table / ARM call made from a Celery task (reconcile_*, auto_warmup, BLAST submit, etc.) logged the full http_logging_policy verbosity at INFO.

The silencer was needed in api.main first because the api sidecar is also the loudest LAW emitter under request load; the worker is even louder in steady-state because it ticks reconcilers on short intervals (reconcile_stale_jobs, reconcile_auto_warmup, …) — every tick fans out into Table reads. The silencer was simply never propagated to the celery entrypoint.

Code diff

# File Change
1 api/celery_app.py Add the same Azure SDK + urllib3/httpx silencer block that already lives in api/main.py, immediately after the module logger handle, before any Celery(...) construction. Defaults to WARNING, overridable via AZURE_LOG_LEVEL.

Patch snippet (mirrors api/main.py):

_azure_log_level = os.environ.get("AZURE_LOG_LEVEL", "WARNING").upper()
for _name in (
    "azure.core.pipeline.policies.http_logging_policy",
    "azure.identity",
    "azure.identity._internal.decorators",
    "azure.identity._credentials.default",
    "urllib3.connectionpool",
    "httpx",
):
    logging.getLogger(_name).setLevel(_azure_log_level)

IaC diff

None.

Tests + lint

uv run ruff check api/celery_app.py
# All checks passed!

uv run pytest -q api/tests/test_smoke.py api/tests/test_blast_queue.py \
  api/tests/test_blast_tasks.py
# 201 passed in 6.60s

Deployment

Both environments were rolled to fresh revisions with the patched image. Env B additionally received fresh terminal and frontend sidecar images so it would no longer trail env A on the cgroup_reporter grace-window patch from the earlier session:

Env Container App RG ACR Sidecar New image tag Final revision
A ca-elb-dashboard-01 rg-elb-dashboard-01 acrelbdashboard01mul5oh5j api / worker / beat (single image) elb-api:20260525222137 0000020
B ca-elb-dashboard rg-elb-dashboard acrelbdashboardtest01 api / worker / beat (single image) elb-api:20260525222807 0000016
B ca-elb-dashboard rg-elb-dashboard acrelbdashboardtest01 terminal elb-terminal:20260525223728 0000017
B ca-elb-dashboard rg-elb-dashboard acrelbdashboardtest01 frontend elb-frontend:20260525224526 0000018

Env A was deployed via the default azd env. Env B's azd env (elb-ca) carries a stale ACR_NAME=acrelbdashboardogi2vbkece (that ACR does not exist in the subscription); the actual deployed ACR for ca-elb-dashboard is acrelbdashboardtest01. Env B was therefore deployed by exporting the correct values manually before scripts/dev/quick-deploy.sh api:

export AZURE_RESOURCE_GROUP=rg-elb-dashboard
export ACR_NAME=acrelbdashboardtest01
export ACR_LOGIN_SERVER=acrelbdashboardtest01.azurecr.io
export CONTAINER_APP_NAME=ca-elb-dashboard
bash scripts/dev/quick-deploy.sh api

This deployment also rolled into env B all the prior session's patches it had been missing — cgroup_reporter.py grace window, wait_redis.py extended timeout, auto_warmup_reconcile.py network-blocked handling — because they all ship in the same elb-api image.

Validation

After all four new revisions reached Healthy + 100 % traffic, the "Azure SDK headers in worker logs" pattern dropped from ~5 700 lines/h to 0 on env A 0000020 and env B 0000016 / 0000017 / 0000018. The remaining log entries on the new revisions are operational (Celery task INFO, our own JSON logger lines, redis status, revision boot messages) — exactly the signal we want to keep.

The strict error categories (AuthorizationFailure, Traceback, FATAL, Connection refused, ERROR/, "level":"ERROR", [ERROR]) remain at 0 on every new revision, confirming the silencer is the only behavioral change. The startup-race Connection refused line that was still visible on env B's previous frontend image (which predated the cgroup_reporter grace window) is also gone now that frontend rev 0000018 carries the patched copy.

SPA serves correctly on env B with production auth posture:

curl -sk --compressed https://<env-b>/runtime-config.js
# VITE_API_BASE_URL:""          → same-origin (no localhost bake-in)
# VITE_AUTH_DEV_BYPASS:"false"  → MSAL enforced

The two pre-existing structural WARNING lines that survived this morning's cleanup remain unchanged and out of scope:

  • worker Celery SecurityWarning: running with superuser privileges — image-level decision, not a code path we want to touch right now.
  • redis WARNING Memory overcommit must be enabled! — kernel sysctl, not addressable from the container.

Follow-up (already noted, not actioned in this change)

  1. The elb-ca azd env's ACR_NAME is wrong. Either correct it to acrelbdashboardtest01 or delete the env entry so the next operator does not waste time chasing ogi2vbkece.
  2. The Storage-vs-ACR lockdown coupling in infra/main.bicep (see the earlier "Follow-up" section above) still stands.